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CALIFORNIA'S NEWSGATHERER'S. SHIELD: 
INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION MEANS 
INADEQUATE PROTECTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Californial is among the majority of states2 that have statu-
torily provided for a shield law protecting newsgatherers from 
contempt for failure to disclose sources or unpublished informa-
tion. In 1980, in an apparent attempt to add teeth to existing 
law, California voters elected to amend the state constitution's 
free speech clauses to include virtually the same shield law pro-
visions codified in the Evidence Code.· The amendment passed 
by an overwhelming majority:1 
The shield law as written is straightforward: no finding of 
contempt for failure to disclose a source, or to disclose unpub-
lished information.6 Unfortunately, there has been a lack of uni-
1. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988) 
2. As of 1988, 26 states have enacted some sort of statutory protection for new-
sgatherers. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1983); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987); CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 110 para. 8-901-909 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 
Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21.100 (Baldwin 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
45:1451-1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (Supp.1988); MICH. 
STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1988); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901-903 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144-147 (1987); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-2 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. JUD. PAN. I, Rule 514C (1986); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (Conso!. Supp. 1988); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1981); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2506 (West 1980); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1988); PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-2-3 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
24-11-208 (1980) 
3. The clause originally read: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his 
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for abuse of the right. A law may not 
restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
4. The original clause is now designated as subdivision (a); the 1980 amendment is 
subdivision (b). CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
5. 73.3% of the voters were in favor of the proposition. March Fong Eu, Secretary of 
State, Supplement to Statement of Vote, Primary Election June 3, 1980 at 8. 
6 .. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. CONST. art. I § 2. 
347 
1
Rousso: Evidence
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
348 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:347 
formity in the judicial application of the shield laws to individ-
ual fact patterns.7 
This may be due, in part, to the following factors: the lack 
of agreement as to the precise meaning of the California stat-
utes, the absence of a detailed legislative history and the diverse 
factual patterns where newsgatherer's shield has been at issue. 
In addition, there is a lack of consensus as to the exact rights 
which the Evidence Code and the constitution seek to protect. 
Cases have, to a large extent, been decided in a piecemeal 
fashion and appear result-oriented, based on the facts of the 
case at hand.8 Exceptions have been carved out on the basis of 
the "type" of material sought to be protected. Outcomes are dif-
ficult to predict, at best. As a consequence, newsgatherers have 
little guidance as to which materials may be safely thought of as 
protected. 
Thus, the shield law, even with its insertion into the consti-
tution, is not facilitating the free flow of information to the pub-
lic as the drafters ostensibly intended. Shield law continues to 
be inconsistently applied and interpreted. This inconsistency 
has led at least one commentator to speculate on whether the 
constitutional amendment served any purpose at all.9 
The major cases of the past fifteen years aptly illustrate the 
problems courts encounter in attempting to apply the news-
gatherer's shield. Clearly, striking a proper balance between im-
portant constitutional rights, such as freedom of the press versus 
the right to a fair trial, is difficult. In addition, courts have had 
to grapple with a confusing array of "tests" to be applied in the 
balancing process. Worse yet, there has been a tendency on the 
part of the courts to apply tests created under one fact pattern 
to other facts which are markedly dissimilar. While all of the 
7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 62, 70 and accompanying text. 
9. See Note, The Newsgatherer's Shield - Why Waste Space in the California Con-
stitution?, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527 (1985). This note covers the judicial interpretation of the 
newsgatherer's shield. The author concludes that narrow construction of the law does 
little to shield reporters, and if the courts continue narrowly construing the law that 
article I, section 2(b) of the California Constitution should be repealed "in the name of 
trimming nonfunctional surplusage." Rather than "trimming" the constitution, this com-
ment asserts that a clear statement is needed from the California Supreme Court Law. 
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tests articulated over the past fifteen years may be valid, it is 
not clear that they are interchangeable. 
Whether the insertion of the newsgatherer's shield into the 
state constitution in fact strengthened the shield is unclear. The 
legislative history of the amendment provides little guidance as 
to the drafters' intent. lo 
Two recent California Court of Appeals decisions, New York 
Times v. Santa Barbara ll and Delaney v. Superior Courtl2 came 
to different conclusions about the scope of protection afforded 
by the newsgatherer's shield. These two cases are currently on 
review before the California Supreme Court. A third case, Hal-
Lissy v. Superior Court l3 may be an indication that the courts 
are headed towards a more uniform interpretation of the shield 
law, provided New York Times is affirmed by the supreme court. 
This Comment will initially discuss the history of the shield 
law in California and examine how it has been defined by the 
courts in the leading cases. It will also discuss New York Times, 
Delaney and Hallissy in terms of the courts' application of the 
shield law to those cases. The analyses of New York Times and 
Hallissy will be contrasted with that of Delaney. This Comment 
will attempt to show how the New York TimeslHallissy analysis 
could have been applied to the facts of Delaney and still have 
yielded the same result. 
Emphasis will be placed on problems facing the courts in 
terms of statutory interpretation. The difficulty' in applying a 
single test to diverse fact patterns will also be addressed. While 
all of the tests that the courts have applied may have validity, 
they are not interchangeable. 
10. The Law Revision Commission was assigned the task of supervising the drafting 
of the Evidence Code. In discussing the privilege, the Commission noted that there was 
an "absence of reliable evidence in the form of legislative history or judicial interpreta-
tion." 6 Cal. L. Rev. Comm. Rep. Rec. and Studies 481, at 508. C{. KSDO v. Superior 
Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375 at 383, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 at 215 (1982) ("The judicial his-
tory and case interpretation of the newsperson's privilege as embodied in Evidence Code 
§ 1070 are just as tortuous and confused as its legislative origins.") 
11. 202 Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), rev. granted, Oct. 27, 
1988)(S006709). 
12. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988), rev. granted, Oct. 27, 
1988)(8006866). 
13. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988). 
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Recommendations will be made with respect to tests which 
would aid the courts in their efforts to achieve a greater degree 
of uniformity. Uniformity would lead to more predictable out-
comes and further the goal of settling on a precise interpretation 
of the shield law statutes. 
This Comment proposes that despite the literal wording of 
the shield law, newsgatherers have at least a qualified privilege 
to not testify or disclose sources or unpublished information. 
The Supreme Court of California should recognize this qualified 
privilege in the interest of clarity and judicial economy. 
The Legislature should excise a comment which immedi-
ately follows the statute." Whether California's shield law pro-
vides a "privilege" or "merely an immunity," or whether "they 
are the same thing" is an issue which must be decided. In addi-
tion, a clear statement regarding the exact scope of protection 
for "unpublished information" is necessary. 
Finally, this Comment will argue that the more rational in-
terpretation of the right conferred by the statute is one which 
views it as a qualified privilege. The particular facts of a case, as 
well as the newsgatherer's status as party or nonparty, should be 
the basis of the proper test to be applied where the shield is at 
issue. 
If the reporter is a party, the case is likely a defamation 
action. It is suggested that the tests appropriate to defamation 
actions are not universally applicable. Where the reporter is not 
a party, the next inquiry should be whether the action is civil or 
criminal. In criminal actions, the burden is on the party seeking 
disclosure to overcome the newsgatherer's qualified privilege. 
The newsgatherer should not have the burden of showing that 
the material for which protection is sought is "deserving" of 
protection. 
In a civil action, this comment suggests that the privilege 
should be absolute, following the holding of New York Times. Io 
14. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. The comment following the statute 
states that the shield provides an immunity,. not a privilege. See also text accompanying 
note 42. 
15. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 510, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430. 
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Labeling the right an absolute privilege in civil suits where the 
reporter is a nonparty would hopefully allow the courts to speed-
ily dispense with those cases in which plaintiffs or defendants 
attempt to utilize newsgatherers as discovery resources. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEWSGATHERER'S 
SHIELD 
A. ORIGINAL LEGISLATION 
California enacted statutory protection for newsgatherers in 
1935, which provided: "A publisher, editor, reporter, or person 
connected with or employed upon a newspaper cannot be ad-
judged in contempt by a court, the Legislature, or any adminis-
trative body, for refusing to disclose the source of any informa-
tion procured for publication and published in anewspaper."16 
Protection was initially limited to those associated with 
newspapers. As time passed, news increasingly was transmitted 
via other media, for example television and radio. The Legisla-
ture broadened the scope of protection accordingly; employees of 
radio and television stations and wire services are now covered.17 
B. EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1070 AND "IMMUNITY FROM 
CONTEMPT" 
In 1965, Subdivision 5 of section 1881 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure was transferred into the Evidence Code. IS In studying 
the proposed transfer, the California Law Revision Commission 
evaluated the issue of "[w]hether a newsman should have a priv-
ilege to prevent disclosure of his source of information."19 In its 
report, the Commission voiced its concern regarding the problem 
of "statutory deficiencies," and "ambiguity and definitions."2o 
The Commission found the notion of a newsgatherer's privilege 
"entirely alien to the common law," and also that "there is no 
federal statute or independent body of federal law on this sub-
16. 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 532 § 1 pp. 1608·10 (West 1935) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 1881) (repealed 1965). 
17. Cal. S'tat. ch. 629, § 1 pp. 1797·98 (1961); see also note 9, at 536. 
18. Former § 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure became CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070. 
19. 6 Cal. L. Revision Comm. Rep. Rec. and Studies 481 (1964). 
20. [d. at 485. 
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ject."21 Finally, the Commission concluded that "there is no le-
gally recognized newsman's privilege in the absence of statute."22 
The Commission's report also discussed the issue of whether 
any statutory privilege was desirable.23 Policy arguments favor-
ing 24 and opposing211 a statutory privilege were put forth. The 
argument in favor was that without protection, news persons 
would be unable to assure confidentiality to sources.26 For exam-
ple, if government employees seeking to expose corruption could 
not be assured of confidentiality, they would be less likely to 
come forward. Sources would dry up and the flow of information 
to the public would be curtailed. 
The opposing argument was that the public interest was 
best served by full disclosure and rested upon "the established 
duty to testify ... axiomatic in our system of justice."27 The 
thrust of this argument was, why should known evidence be kept 
secret? 
Two countervailing arguments-the need to keep open the 
channels of information by assuring confidentiality versus "the 
right to everyman's evidence"28-had been balanced by the ma-
jority of states, in practice at least.29 The policy of "divulging 
pertinent information to proper authorities"30 was weighed 
against the value of legal protection for those who exposed 
"matters which require public attention."31 Thus, the Commis-
sion concluded that newsmen should be afforded a privilege sim-
ilar to that extended to "proper governmental authorities."32 
21. [d. at 488. 
22. [d. at 496. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 497. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 498. 
30. [d. at 500. 
31. [d. 
32. Unfortunately, the report does not contain an example of what the Commission 
considered a "privilege extended to a proJ)er governmental authority" to be. For that 
matter, the report does not indicate who the Commission thought the "proper govern-
mental authorities" were. [d. 
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Having concluded that protection for newsgatherers was de-
sirable, the Commission focused on defining the proper scope of 
protection. Apparently alarmed by the wording of the statute, 
the Commission noted that the statute appeared to grant "an 
absolute privilege to newsmen,"33 which amounted to "a legisla-
tive determination that the public interest is best served by non-
disclosure in every situation."M The Commission thus found 
that a qualified privilege should exist and proposed a "discre-
tionary" rule which would adequately protect any interest re-
quiring legal sanctity while exposing those matters that de-
manded revelation. 311 
A statutory rule of privilege was proffered, one which would 
"protect the source of newsman's informants."36 A newsgatherer 
could refuse to testify unless it was found that "(a) the source 
had been disclosed previously, or (b) disclosure of the source is 
required in the public interest."3? 
The Commission then supplemented its proposed rule with 
a comment subsequently adopted by the Assembly Committee 
on the Judiciary, which states: 
It should be noted that section 1070 provides an 
immunity from being judged in contempt; it does 
not create a privilege. Thus, the provision will not 
prevent the use of the sanctions provided by the 
discovery act when the newsman is a party to a 
civil proceeding. In this sense, section 1070 re-
tains existing law.s8 
The Commission did not specify the meaning of the term 
"immunity from contempt" with respect to non-party news-
gatherers. The issue was created whether "immunity" provides 
more, less, or the same protection that a privilege does. This is-
sue has been hotly debated,39 and the "textual ambiguity"40 has 
33. Jd. at 502. 
34.Id. 
35.Id. 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 505. 
38. 7 Cal. L. Revision Comm. Rep. Rec. and Studies 207 at 208 1965. 
39. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. 
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). ("Labeling the protection an immunity rather than a privi-
7
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been noted as the shield's main flaw. 
The Legislature, in adopting the comment, stated that a 
privilege had not been created. It is unclear whether this issue 
has been resolved. When the shield is referred to as a "privi-
lege," is it just shorthand for referring to a newsgatherer's right 
to refuse to disclose sources, or does a genuine legal privilege 
exist? In other words, does forbidding the imposition of the 
sanction of contempt amount to a privilege to not testify in 
court for all newsgatherers? In addition, does the fact that sanc-
tions "other than contempt" may be imposed on party news-
gatherers mean that in other situations contempt may be Im-
posed on nonparty newsgatherers? 
The "privilege or immunity" issue has meant that the pro-
tection afforded by the shield is reevaluated with every case. 
The lack of harmony among the reported decisions suggests that 
this approach is unsound. It is unclear why one standard regard-
ing the scope of protection has not been enunciated. A clear 
statement regarding the exact breadth of the protection afforded 
by the shield is necessary. Such a statement should consider the 
proper scope of protection for the newsgatherer as party and as 
nonparty; and also whether the litigation is civil or criminal. The 
California Supreme Court should address the question of 
whether the insertion of the newsgatherer's shield into the State 
constitution elevated its scope of protection. It should also clar-
ify the scope of protection for unpublished information. 
Since 1965, three amendments have been made to Evidence 
Code section 1070 substantially broadening the scope of its pro-
tection.u First, protection was extended to ex-newspersons.'2 
Next, the statute was broadened to apply to other governmental 
entities possessing subpoena power, such as legislatures and ad-
lege is of no importance.") But cf. Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 
1025 n.8, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 64 n.8 (1988) ("The shield law has always been limited in 
scope. It has never contained a privilege against disclosure. Rather, it merely provides 
'an immunity' from being adjudged in contempt.") Contra, New York Times v. Superior 
Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (1988) (citing HOGAN, MODERN 
CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY, (3d ed. 1981) § 11.27 p. 350) ("In cases where the newsgatherer is 
not a party, this 'immunity' is the functional equivalent of a privilege.") 
40. 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527 at 538 (1985). 
41.. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988). 
42. 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1717, § 1 pp. 3658. 
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ministrative bodies.43 Then, in order to ensure that all members 
of the media were protected,those newspersons not afforded pro-
tection by the literal wording of the statute were granted protec-
tion." Finally, the category of unpublished information, such as 
notes and outtakes was included. 411 This includes information 
not disseminated, regardless of whether related information has 
been disseminated.48 
Today, the shield law protects virtually all those engaged in 
newsgathering. The threshold requirement is that the material 
must have been obtained during the course of newsgathering for 
communication to the public.47 The fact that information related 
to the protected material may have been published should not 
lessen the scope of protection afforded. In addition, whether the 
material is protected should not depend on its contents, al-
though the courts are still debating this point.48 
C. SHIELD LAW AND THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
In 1980, the free speech clause of the state constitution was 
amended to include language virtually identical to that found in 
Evidence Code section 1070,49 The amendment may have been 
motivated in part by two cases, Farr v. Superior Court50 and 
Rosato v. Superior Court,51 which did not apply the shield. 
In Farr, a reporter covering the trial of Charles Manson and 
two codefendants was given a copy of the sealed statement of a 
witness containing testimony about the planning of other 
murders. 52 Farr wrote an article based on this information. 58 
43. 1974 Cal. Stat., ch. 1323 § 1 pp. 2877. 
44. [d. 
45. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(c) (West Supp. 1988). 
46. The text concludes by including in its definition of "unpublished information" 
the following, "[w)hether or not published information based upon or related to such 
material has been disseminated." [d. 
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (West Supp. 1988). 
48. Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019 at 1030, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 at 
67 ("Unpublished information provisions do not apply to compelled eyewitness testi-
mony concerning a public event.") See infra text accompanying note 150. 
49. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
50 .. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), 
51.. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr.427 (1975). 
52. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344. 
53. [d. at 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344. 
9
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The court was determined to identify the party who had given 
the information to Farr since the source had to have been one of 
the attorneys of record.~· 
Farr was cited for contempt after refusing to disclose the 
source of the sealed statement.1i1i In upholding the contempt ci-
tation, the court of appeals found that "in the matter at bench 
there is an undeniable need for disclosure if the court is not to 
be thwarted in its effort to enforce its order against pretrial pub-
licity."lis Control over the proceedings and the officers of the 
court were found to be paramount concerns. ~7 
In Rosato, a grand jury transcript indicting various individ-
uals was ordered sealed until the conclusion of all of the defend-
ants' trials.1i8 Thereafter, quotations from the transcript ap-
peared in the Fresno Bee, under Rosato's byline. Rosato, like 
Farr, refused to disclose from whom he had received the tran-
script. ~9 
The Court of Appeals upheld Rosato's citation of con-
tempt.so In so holding, the court found that in the interest of 
maintaining the free flow of information to the public as in-
tended by the Legislature, a "broad, rather than narrow con-
struction" of the statute was appropriate.s1 There were, however, 
certain "limitations on the exercise of the privilege," and there-
fore the shield law was not applicable in Rosato's case.S2 
In explaining why Rosato was not to be protected by the 
shield, the court cited Branzburg v. HayesS3 and noted that the 
54. Id. at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345. 
55.Id. 
56. Id. at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350. 
57. The court concluded that after balancing "[t)he interest to be served by disclos-
ure of source against its potential inhibition upon the free flow of information" that Farr 
had no privilege to refuse to answer questions put to him in the trial court. Id. 
58. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434 (1975). 
59.Id. 
60. Id. at 231, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 454. 
61. Id. at 219, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445. 
62. Although the court conceded that § 1070 did arguably provide newsgatherers 
with a privilege against being held in contempt, the court stated that the party claiming 
the privilege had the burden of showing that the testimony "would lead to a source." [d. 
at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445. The court characterized this burden to be "not a heavy 
one." Id. 
63. 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). (By a 5-4 vote, the court found that newsgatherers did 
10
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First Amendment does not confer "a license on either the re-
porter or his sources to violate valid criminal laws. "64 Like the 
court in Farr, the Rosato court found a limitation on the First 
Amendment arising from "the inherent power of the judiciary as 
a separate and coequal branch of our tripartite governmental 
structure to control its own officers and proceedings."611 
After the decisions in Farr and Rosato, the Legislature initi-
ated legislation to amend the constitution to include a provision 
for the protection of newsgatherers.66 The legislative intent is 
unclear. Since there was already a statutory source of protection 
for news gatherers in Evidence Code section 1070, the Legislature 
may have believed that inserting a similar provision into the 
state constitution would somehow fortify the scope of its protec-
tion. Presumably, the shield would then be less susceptible to 
judicial tampering. 
The fact that the amendment is worded in virtually the 
same fashion as the Evidence Code67 may provide an argument 
that the intent was to elevate the shield simply by virtue of its 
insertion into the state constitution. On the other hand, had the 
amendment been worded differently the "elevation" might have 
been more clear. Significantly, the "immunity, not privilege" 
comment following the statute was not included.68 However, had 
the constitutional amendment stated that news gatherers have a 
privilege to not testify, all of the speculation concerning the ef-
fect of constitutionalization would be unnecessary. As a result, 
at least one commentator has concluded that the amendment 
did little or nothing to bolster Evidence Code Section 1070.69 
not have a constitutional privilege to refuse to testify at state or federal grand jury hear-
ings, and encouraged state legislatures to provide for their own newsgatherer shields). 
64. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446. 
65.Id. 
66. There are three ways in which the state constitution may be amended: by initia-
tive; by legislative proposal; and by constitutional convention. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII §§ 
1-4. 
67. The only difference in the wording of the two statutes is that where the Evi-
dence Code reads "cannot" be adjudged in contempt, the constitutional clause reads 
"shall not" be adjudged in contempt. There is no support for the proposition that this 
difference was intended to be of any significance. 
68. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 Comment-Assembly Committee on the Judiciary. (West 
Supp. 1988). 
69. See supra note 9, at 546. 
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III. PRIVILEGE OR IMMUNITY? 
A. KSDO V. SUPERIOR COURT 
KSDO v. Superior Court70 involved a libel action against a 
radio station and a news reporter. The case was based on a news 
broadcast implicating members of a southern California police 
department in a drug smuggling operation.71 In KSDO, the court 
commented that while "the term 'shield law' conjures up visions 
of broad protection and sweeping privilege, [the law] is unique 
in that it affords only limited protection." 72 
The court found that the inclusion of the law in the state 
constitution did little to broaden its scope of protection73 and 
thus declared, "[i]n reality, California Constitution article I sec-
tion 2 provides no more of a privilege than did section 1070 of 
the Evidence Code."74 In the court's view, the shield law pro-
vided "[a]n immunity from contempt, not a privilege against 
disclosure.7Ii A discussion of the effects of constitutionalization 
of that immunity is not necessary to resolution of the case 
before us. "78 
The KSDO court shared the fears of the Law Revision Com-
mission against "creating a privilege."77 Noting the Commis-
sion's comment78 that a privilege had not been created, the court 
70. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982). 
71. Id. at 378, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 212. 
72. The court found that there was a "rather basic distinction" between the terms 
'immunity' and 'privilege.' Id. This distinction, according to the court, "has been mis-
stated and apparently misunderstood by members of the news media and our courts as 
well." Id. at 379-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213. The court did not, however, elaborate what 
the "basic distinction" to be made was. Instead, it was merely noted that in the jurisdic-
tions which did provide newsgatherers with a privilege, the word "privilege" was used in 
the text of the statute. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
73. In its recounting of the history of the shield law, the court may have indicated 
its opinion of the shield when it described the insertion of the statute into the constitu-
tion as a "curious step" in the evolution of the law. Id. at 381, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 214. 
74. Id. at 381-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213. 
75. Id. at 383, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
76.Id. 
77. The court found that although the Evidence Code and constitution did not pro-
tect the petitioner, the first amendment did. Id. at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The court 
went on to outline the considerations which would be used in balancing "freedom of the 
press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal 
conduct." Id. 
78. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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stated that in other states where a privilege had been created, 
the word "privilege" was a part of the text of the statute.7S 
Emphasizing that the case was a libel action in which the 
reporter was a party, the KSDO court stated that "the shield 
law does not apply since petitioner has not been threatened with 
or cited for contempt."so However, the court did not elaborate 
on its reasons for finding that the accusation of libel renders a 
reporter ineligible for protection by the shield. 
Implicitly, the court found that libel actions were unique 
situations and to uphold the shield would have unfairly 
prejudiced the plaintiff. This argument was grounded in the as-
sumption that the material for which the privilege had been 
claimed contained "vital information directly related to the 
plaintiff's claim."sl Citing BranzburgS2 and Garland v. Torre,S3 
an earlier federal case, the KSDO court found that in libel cases, 
"the truth or falsity of the material published is the essential 
issue [and] therefore production of the reporter's notes for iden-
tification of his source can be essential to the plaintiff's success-
ful prosecution. "S4 
Clearly, a reporter's notes would provide plaintiffs in libel 
actions with evidence in support of their claims that the re-
porter's state of mind was such that "actual malice"slI could be 
79. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 383 nA, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216 nA. (The court referred to a 
New Jersey statute construed in Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 44 A.2d 
376, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982) which states in essence that newsgatherers have a 
privilege to refuse to disclose sources or unpublished information). 
80. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216. 
81. The court discussed the issue of whether the identity of the sources for whom 
protection was sought went to the "heart of the claim" and found that it did not, because 
the reporters had previously revealed their names. [d. The court also found that the 
status of the reporter as a party to the litigation would tip the scales "[i)n favor of dis· 
closure of the material in question." [d. at 386,186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. However, since the 
information was available to the plaintiff from sources other than those the reporter 
sought to protect, the court held that the "[q)ualified privilege under the First Amend-
ment protected KSDO from having to reveal the reporter's notes." [d. 
82. 408 U.S. 665. 
83. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (libel 
action brought by actress Judy Garland after an unflattering item had appeared in a 
local gossip column regarding Garland's weight). 
84. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. 
85. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) ("actual malice" de-
fined as publication of false or defamatory material "with knowlege that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false"). 
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inferred by publication. The KSDO court neglected, however, to 
elaborate as to how the interest of aiding a libel plaintiff was to 
be balanced against the interest of protecting confidential 
sources. It is not clear why aiding a libel plaintiff validates limit-
ing the scope of protection afforded by the shield law. 
The issue is best framed in terms of the public interest. 
While aiding a libel plaintiff in the prosecution of a claim is of 
some interest to the public, is not a greater interest served by 
policies which increase, rather than impede, the flow of informa-
tion to the public? 
The KSDO court concluded that in determining the scope 
of protection, a balancing approach was appropriate, utilizing 
the following factors: 1) the nature of the proceeding; 2) the sta-
tus of the newsperson as party or nonparty; 3) alternative 
sources of information; and 4) the relationship of the informa-
tion to the "heart of the claim."8s 
Ostensibly this approach is applicable to all shield law 
cases. However, a better approach would first ask whether the 
reporter was a party. If not, the other KSDO factors might not 
be as appropriate to consider as other factors, such as whether 
the proceeding was civil or criminal. Significantly, the court in 
KSDO concluded that the shield law provided no protection for 
the newsgatherers; instead, they were protected by virtue of a 
"[q]ualified privilege under the First Amendment."87 
The finding of the court was laudable in the sense that the 
reporter was not cited for contempt and did not have to reveal 
his source. However, since the court did not base its finding of 
privilege on the provisions of the shield, the finding is of little 
precedential value in determining the shield's scope of protec-
tion. In addition, the court chose not to discuss the effect of in-
serting the shield law provisions into the state constitution.88 
Thus, the KSDO holding provides little guidance on the ques-
tion of whether the insertion of the shield into the constitution 
did in fact elevate its protection. It should also be noted that the 
test articulated in KSDO was grounded in a libel action. This 
86. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. 
87. [d. at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
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test is of limited value in evaluating cases where the reporter is 
not a party to the action. In those cases, contempt is generally 
the only sanction available. And, since the express terms of the 
statute preclude the finding of contempt, a privilege in effect ex-
ists. The California Supreme Court addressed this issue two 
years later in Mitchell v. Superior Court.89 
Mitchell, another libel case, involved a suit by the Synanon 
organization against The Reader's Digest, an author who had 
written about Synanon for the magazine, and David and Cathy 
Mitchell, who had written a series of articles criticizing the or-
ganization in their newspaper, The Point Reyes Light.90 Syna-
non sought, through discovery, to obtain nearly all documents in 
the Mitchells' possession relating to the organization.91 Synanon 
asserted that the documents would support its claim that dam-
aging evidence had been emphasized while more favorable evi-
dence had been suppressed.92 
, 
The California Supreme Court did not refer to the shield 
law as providing a privilege. The court did, however, note that 
"since contempt is generally the only effective remedy against a 
nonparty witness [and] the shield law prohibit[s] a finding of 
contempt, a privilege of nondisclosure had in fact been 
created."93 
The Mitchell court then added a qualification which has 
been widely quoted in succeeding years. "A party to civillitiga-
tion who disobeys an order to disclose evidence. . .may be sub-
ject to a variety of other sanctions, including the entry of judg-
ment against him."94 The problem is that later courts have 
quoted the passage in order to bolster findings that the reporter 
was not protected by the shield law-regardless of whether the 
reporter was a party to the action.95 A close reading of Mitchell, 
89. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 690 P.2d 625 (1984). 
90.Id. 
9!. Id. at 273, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154, 690 P.2d at 627. 
92. In its complaint, Synanon alleged that the Mitchells "conspired and acted in 
concert with each other to write, edit and publish to and among each other and to the 
readers of the article the false, malicious and defamatory words and language contained 
therein." Id. at 273, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154, 690 P.2d at 627. 
93. Id. at 274, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155, 690 P.2d at 628. 
94. Id. (emphasis in original). 
95. See Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635, 
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however, leads to the conclusion that libel actions are unique. 
The tests which are useful in evaluating shield law cases based 
on libel are not universally applicable. 
The Mitchell court found that the goal of protecting confi-
dential sources and information could not be ignored.96 A test 
was suggested which, in civil cases, would "weigh the assorted 
interests in light of the facts of the case before [the court]."97 
The court held that a "qualified privilege" existed vis-a-vis com-
pelled disclosure, depending on the facts of the particular case.98 
According to the Mitchell court, the test for determining 
the scope of the privilege has four factors: 1) whether the re-
porter was a party; 2) the relevance of the information sought to 
the plaintiff's cause of action; 3) whether the plaintiff had ex-
hausted all alternative sources of the information; and 4) the im-
portance of protecting confidentiality in the case at hand.99 
The Mitchell test may prove to be the most effective in 
evaluating claims of newsgatherer's privilege in libel actions. 
However, the court did not provide a solution when the answer 
to the first question was negative. In other words, what is the 
scope of the privilege where the newsgatherer is a nonparty? Un-
til recently, little attention has been paid to this question. A 
clear statement by the California Supreme Court about the 
scope of protection for nonparty news gatherers in both civil and 
criminal actions is needed. It may be, as was suggested by the 
court in New York Times 100 that in civil actions, where the new-
sperson is a nonparty, the Mitchell balancing factors are not 
necessary. 
639 (1988); Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1025 n.8, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 
64 n.8 (1988); see also WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1291 at 1234 (3d ed. 1986). 
96. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 276, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 156, 690 P. 2d at 629 ("We cannot 
ignore or subordinate the First Amendment values furthered by the protection of confi-
dential sources and information; at the same time, we must recognize the parallel impor-
tance of the policy of favoring full disclosure of relevant evidence.") 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 279-83, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-61, 690 P. 2d at 632-34. 
100. 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429. 
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B. HAMMARLEY V. SUPERIOR COURT 
Hammarley v. Superior Court lOl illustrates the point that 
the nature of the litigation-civil or criminal-and the status of 
the newsgatherer-party or nonparty-is highly relevant to the 
type of analysis utilized in shield law cases. John Hammarley, a 
reporter for the Sacramento Union, wrote three articles in 1979 
about the "Mexican Mafia. II102 The articles contained statements 
implicating certain "mafia members" in a murder. lOS Ham-
marley's source was a former "member" who had "defected" and 
was a witness for the prosecution.l04 
After receipt of subpoena as a witness in the criminal ac-
tion, Hammarley moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds 
that it sought production of "unpublished information" pro-
tected by Evidence Code section 1070.105 The superior court re-
fused to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the "unpub-
lished information" provision applied only to material leading to 
sources, not to unpublished information in genera1.106 Ham-
marley was cited for contempt, which was stayed pending 
appea1.107 
The Hammarley opinion is noteworthy in at least two re-
spects. First, the opinion established the principle that the "un-
published information" section of the Evidence Code was not 
limited to source disclosure. "[T]he statutory privilege protect-
ing unpublished information is not limited to material which 
might [lead to source disclosure] but encompasses all informa-
tion ... not disseminated to the public. II108 
Second, the Hammarley test is well suited to the situation 
where the person claiming the privilege is a nonparty, especially 
where the party seeking disclosure is a criminal defendant. 
101. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979). 
102. [d. at 392, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610. 
103. [d. at 393, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610. 
104. [d. 
105. See text accompanying notes 10, 48. 
106. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 611. 
107. [d. at 395, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 611. 
108. [d. at 398, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The court characterized this view as an "ex-
pansive interpretation" in finding that protection was not limited to source disclosure. 
[d. at 397, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613. 
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Hammarley set out a three-part test. First, the party seek-
ing disclosure must show that the information is "relevant and 
necessary to his case."109 Next, the party must show that the 
information is not available from a source "less intrusive on the 
privilege."llo Finally, he must show that the evidence sought 
might reasonably result in his exoneration. lll 
The test is suitable for evaluating claims of privilege where 
the newsgatherer is not a party, as it provides for a balancing 
between the interest of a free press with the right to a fair trial. 
The problem is that this test seems best suited to criminal liti-
gation. It is not clear that it is applicable in the situation of civil 
litigation where the reporter is not a party. 
The better approach would be to apply the Mitchell test in 
the particularized situation of libel and the Hammarley test in 
criminal cases where the reporter is not a party. In civil cases 
where the reporter is a nonparty, there does not appear to be a 
compelling state interest in obtaining the newsgatherer's testi-
mony. In that situation, no "test" is necessary and there is an 
absolute privilege to not testify. If an absolute privilege is not 
found desireable, there should be at least a qualified privilege. 
The qualified privilege would require a strong showing on the 
part of the party seeking disclosure before disclosure would be 
compelled. 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
New York Times v. Superior Court1l2 and Hallissy v. Supe-
rior Court1l3 aptly illustrate the benefit which would be obtained 
by clarifying the scope of protection for nonparty newsgatherers. 
The approach taken by the courts in those two cases suggest 
that a rigorous classification scheme might simplify analysis of 
shield law cases, as well as to protect the interests of news-
persons adequately. 
109. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. (citing People v. Borunda, 11 Cal. 3d 523, 527, 113 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827, 522 
P. 2d 1, 3 (1974)). 
112. 202 Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988). 
113. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988). 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss2/4
1989] EVIDENCE 365 
The balance of this Comment suggests a proper scheme of classi-
fication of shield law cases which would aid the courts in evalu-
ating claims of newsgatherer's privilege where the reporter is not 
a party. This Comment also suggests that if the California Su-
preme Court affirms New York Times, it may be considered 
proof that the insertion of section 1070 into the constitution did 
elevate its scope of protection. 
A. THE HALLISSY CASE 
Hallissy arose after reporter Erin Hallissy interviewed John 
Sapp 114 in jail as he was awaiting trial. Sapp had been charged 
with three counts of murder, plus multiple murder, rendering 
him eligible to receive the death penalty.llli Hallissy wrote an 
article published in the Contra Costa Times entitled "I Killed 
Many for Pay." The prosecutor then amended the complaint to 
include murder for financial gain.1I6 
Hallissy was subpoenaed by the defendant to appear at the 
preliminary examination with the notes of her interview.ll7 She 
successfully quashed the subpoena on the grounds that the un-
published material was protected by the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution and by article 1, section 2b of the Califor-
nia Constitution.1I8 
Sapp filed a motion in accordance with the Penal Code119 
which stated, in essence, that Hallissy was a witness in his be-
half whom he had a right to call.120 The defense contended that 
Sapp's statements to Hallissy contradicted previous statements, 
and this contradiction cast doubt on his veracity. 121 Casting 
doubt on his veracity, in turn, weakened the reliability of earlier 
statements confessing to the murders.122 
114. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635. 
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1988). 
116. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1985). 
120. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. 636. (The appellate court 
stated that "one of several contentions raised was that the order quashing the subpoena 
denied Sapp his substantial right to call a witness in his behalf.") 
121. [d. 
122. Defendant contended that he had "confessed all over the place" and therefore 
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At the hearing, the superior court held it should balance the 
detriment to the reporter caused by forced disclosure with the 
harm the defendant would suffer were he not allowed to obtain 
the information.12s The superior court ruled in Sapp's favor on 
the grounds that the criminal defendant's rights outweighed the 
value of protecting a newsgatherer. l24 The basis of the holding, 
however, was not that Sapp had made a showing that he would 
be denied his right to a fair trial; the court instead based its 
ruling on the fact that the party seeking disclosure was the 
source himself. "We have no confidential sources. We have no 
witnesses and names being sought to be protected."1211 
The fact that the party seeking disclosure was the source 
himself was novel. But this did not justify neglect of the proper 
evaluation, which was whether the defendant had met the bur-
den of defeating a claim of privilege under the shield law. The 
Evidence Code and the state constitution clearly protect against 
disclosure of sources and "unpublished information" regardless 
of whether such information has been disseminated to the pub-
lic.12s The code and the constitution do not state that the iden-
tity of the source is a relevant consideration. 
Hallissy was held in contempt by the superior court for re-
fusing to testify and the court of appeals granted review. The 
appellate court quoted Mitchell for the proposition that the 
shield law did not itself preclude the imposition of sanctions 
other than contempt; but noted that Mitchell had also found 
that contempt was "generally the only effective remedy against a 
nonparty witness."127 The Hallissy court found that the shield 
law "confers the absolute immunity it appears to offer only 
his confessions were unreliable. See Petitioner's Request for Stay, Petition for Writ of 
Mandate at 35. 
123. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636 "Although the newspa-
pers are entitled to the protection of their sources and the confidentiality of information, 
this is a case that doesn't involve that in any way." This typifies the tendency of some 
courts to diminish the scope of protection for "unpublished information." 
124. [d. 
125. The lower court had apparently presumed that since the "source" himself was 
also the party seeking disclosure, no confidentiality was at stake. 
126. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988). 
127. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1042, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The court cited 
Mitchell for the proposition that "compelled disclosure might be appropriate in those 
cases in which are parties." 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635, citing 
Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 690 p.2d 625. 
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when a nonparty witness refuses to disclose the covered 
information. "128 
The court in Hallissy did not clarify what was meant by the 
term "absolute immunity." It did not hold, for example, that 
"absolute immunity" provides newsgatherers with more protec-
tion than "immunity" alone. Nor did the court discuss the dif-
ference, if any, between "privilege" and "absolute immunity." 
However, the approach the court utilized could have been 
grounded in the assumption that at least a qualified privilege for 
newsgatherers exists.129 The burden of overcoming the qualified 
privilege is on the party seeking disclosure, as had been found in 
Hammarley.lSO Although it was compelling in Hallissy that the 
source himself was the party seeking disclosure, nonetheless he 
still had to meet the burden of overcoming the news gatherer's 
privilege. 
That burden, according to the Hallissy court, was meeting 
Hammarley's three part test.lSl The defendant had to show that 
the information was relevant and necessary to the case; that it 
was not available from a source "less intrusive on the privilege;" 
and that if the information was produced it might reasonably 
lead to his exoneration.ls2 In defendant Sapp's case, the court 
found that only one of the three requirements had been close to 
being met: that of relevancy.lSS 
Even though the court described the newsgatherer's shield 
as an "absolute immunity" and not as a "privilege," it neverthe-
less treated the reporter as though she had at least a qualified 
privilege. 1M The court's analysis is similar to that used in evalu-
ating claims of privilege-focusing on the burden to be met by 
128. [d. at 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39. 
129. See id. at 1045-1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639, (citing Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d 
at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614) (the court discussed what a party "faced with a claim of 
privilege" had to show in order to overcome that privilege). 
130. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639. 
131. [d. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. (The court found that Sapp "arguably [approached] an adequate showing of 
relevancy: he wishes to attack his own credibility by using inconsistent statements that 
he may have made to the reporter during the interview.") 
134. [d. (The court viewed the shield as providing a qualified privilege by its use of 
the Hammarley test. which outlined the task necessary to overcome a qualified 
privilege). 
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the party seeking to overcome the privilege.1811 
Although the court might easily have overcome Hallissy's 
claim of privilege by pointing out that there was no confidential 
source being protected, as had the lower court,186 it did not. The 
Hallissy court focused on what was necessary to defeat a claim 
of privilege. Hallissy may be viewd as a reaffirmation of Ham-
mar ley in the sense that the shield protects against disclosure of 
sources and against disclosure of unpublished information, re-
gardless of who the source is. 
If this approach is uniformly adopted, a higher degree of 
consistency and predictability might result. The Hallissy opin-
ion can be viewed as a tacit acknowledgement that the scope of 
the shield is broad and not to be narrowly applied. If the quali-
fied privilege is to be overcome, it must not be on the basis of 
the contents of the material for which protection is sought, but 
instead because the party seeking disclosure has made a suffi-
cient showing of the material's releveance and necessity to the 
case. 
B. NEW YORK TIMES: ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE FOR NONPARTY 
NEWS GATHERERS 
Close on the heels of Hallissy came New York Times v. Su-
perior Court. 18? This case contains the the clearest, most 
sweepng affirmation of an absolute privilege for nonparty new-
sgatherers in civil actions. 
In New York Times, a reporter working for the Santa Bar-
bara News-Press l88 witnessed an auto accident and took photos 
at the accident scene.18B A personal injury suit and products lia-
bility action was brought against Volkswagen of America, Inc.140 
135. The court's opinion consistently refers to what Sapp needed to prove to over-
come the privilege. The opinion discusses the "nature" of the privilege in a cursory fash-
ion, noting but briefly its origins. This approach is sound in the sense that it may be 
viewed as a tacit acknowledgement of at least a qualified privilege, despite calling it an 
"immunity." 
136. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text. 
137. 202 Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426. 
138. The Santa Barbara News-Press is owned by the New York Times. 
139. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 505, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 427. 
140. [d. at 505, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 427. 
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Volkswagen sought production of "all photographs, negatives, 
notes and letters" in the possession of the News-Press to com-
pare with photos taken by the California Highway Patrol. UI 
News-Press contended that the photos were of little addi-
tional value and refused to produce them.u2 Volkswagen moved 
to compel production of the photographs. us Despite News-
Press' contention that the photos were "absolutely priviliged" 
under both the Evidence Code and the state constitution, the 
superior court found that only a qualified privilege existed.144 
The lower court attempted to view the photos in camera to de-
termine whether Volkswagen's right to discovery outweighed the 
qualified privilege.146 News-Press sought releif by way of ex-
traordinary writ and a stay of the court's order.ue 
The court of appeals noted that the lower court had viewed 
the issue as "a tempest in a teapot," as confidential sources were 
not involved.147 The lower court in New York Times had at-
tempted to analyze the issue in terms of the type of material for 
which protection was being sought,U8 just as the court in Hal-
lissy had fucused on the fact that the party seeking disclosure 
was the source himself. 
Volkswagen contended that only a qualified privilege ex-
isted which was "outweighed by a public policy favoring disclos-
ure of relevant evidence. "149 Apparently recognizing that helping 
141. [d. 
142. [d. 
143. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 505, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 427. 
144. [d. 
145. [d. 
146. [d. 
147. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 507,248 Cal. Rptr. at 428. The court said 
that it would not speculate on the manner in which the News-Press ran its paper. "We 
assume, however, that it is not with the same insouciance expressed by Charles Foster 
Kane." The court was referring to the film "Citizen Kane," where Kane states: "I don't 
know how to run a newspaper, Mr. Thatcher. I just try everything that works." (Citizen 
Kane, 1949). 
148. The unpublished photos which Volkswagen sought were of little value in a new-
smaking sense and did not concern a confidential source; the appellate court noted that 
the trial judge had concluded that the photos "would undoubtedly rest in some dusty 
repository until they are put in the wastebasket." 202 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 248 Cal. Rptr. 
at 428. While it is tempting to disregard such unimportant information, it is these inno-
cent exceptions which may lead to later inconsistencies or more exceptions. 
149. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 428. 
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an auto manufacturer defend a products liability action was of 
limted value to the public, the court of appeals found that Volk-
swagen's construction of the law "would substantially impair a 
newsgatherer's access to information. "1110 
The New York Times court apparently recognized the dan-
ger of overapplication of the "policy of disclosure" argument. 1111 
It is true that public policy favors that which encourages rather 
than impedes the free flow of information. However, the princi-
ple behind the policy should not be overlooked. The "policy of 
disclosure" is based on the public's need to be informed about 
matters of general import; for example the exposure of corrup-
tion. The "policy of disclosure" argument should not be empha-
sized to the point where newsgatherers, who are the means by 
which the public receives its information, unwittingly and un-
willingly become vast and potent resources of discovery. This is 
inconsistent with the basic notion of a free and unfettered press. 
After noting briefly that the Evidence Code and state con-
stitution did not literally create a privilege, the New York Times 
court found no difference between the terms "immunity" and 
"privilege."11l2 The court eloquently and emphatically discounted 
any difference in meaning. "But, as a rose is a rose by any other 
name, so too is a privilege. Nonparty newsgatherers receive ab-
solute protection against compelled disclosure. IIlIiS 
The court conceded that a qualified privilege may exist in 
criminal matters and in those situations "a balancing of compet-
ing interests may be appropriate. "1114 The court correctly pointed 
out however, that the scope of protection was not limited to 
source disclosure. lGII 
The New York Times court also noted that the Mitchell 
150. [d. 
151. It is conceded that at least where the rights of a criminal defendant are at 
stake, there is a duty on the part of citizens to testify. See supra accompanying notes 27-
29. 
152. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. 
155. "The Constitution and the statute recognize that a newsgatherer's information 
must be protected whether or not that information comes from a confidential source." 
[d. at 510, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430. 
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balancing of interest test1ll8 had been premised on a libel action 
and hence was not applicable in all cases involving the shield 
law.1G7 Citing Playboy Enterprises v. Superior Court,1G8 the 
court stated that in the Playboy case, also a civil action, discov-
ery had been sought by a nonparty to the action. 1I19 The court 
construed Playboy as having found the shield law to be para-
mount as compared to a civil litigant's right to discovery.18o The 
New York Times court pointed out, however, that the Playboy 
court had "engendered confusion by pausing to consider a 
threshold question" of whether to balance competing interests of 
news gatherers with civil lawsuit defendants.18l According to the 
court in New York Times, the Playboy court was mistaken. The 
question "need not have been asked. In civil cases where the 
newsgatherer is not a party, the privilege is absolute."182 
For the appellate court in New York Times, the lower 
court's inquiry as to what use the photos were to be put was also 
inappropriate.18s "Whether the photos are bound for oblivion in 
156. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 690 P. 2d 
625 (1984). 
157. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429 The court 
noted Volkswagen's contention that only a qualified privilege existed and cited Mitchell 
for support: "What this argument overlooks is that the newsgatherers in Mitchell who 
were seeking to resist the order for discovery were parties to the lawsuit. Our Supreme 
Court pointed out that compelled disclosure might be appropriate in those cases in 
which [newspersons] are parties." [d. 
158. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984) (libel action arising out of an 
interview by Playboy with the comedy team Cheech and Chong, in which Cheech and 
Chong made disparaging remarks about their former manager and his handling of their 
financial affairs). 
159. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429. 
160. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509 n.2, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429 n.2: "The 
Playboy court ruled that all information acquired by a nonparty witness in the course of 
news gathering [came] within the protection of California's newsgathering shield law." 
With respect to the rights of the criminally accused, the court also quoted Playboy's 
finding that "[i]n cases involving a conflict between the criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial and a newsperson's protection under the First Amendment and 
section 1070, the criminal defendant's constitutionally derived protection has resulted in 
the rule that 'where the criminal defendant has demonstrated a reasonable possibility 
that evidence sought ... might result in his exoneration, he is entitled to its discovery.' " 
(citing Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 24-25, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215). 
161. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430. 
162. [d. (the court wryly noted, "the term 'Playboy Court' does not reflect our view 
of the court, but only refers to the case decided by the court, id. at 509 n.3, 248 Cal. 
Rptr. at 430 n.3). 
163. [d. 
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a wastebasket or have some special significance to the News-
Press is not important. The newsgatherer on the beat does not 
have to worry about potential use of his or her material in third 
party actions."18. Reiterating its position, the court stated that 
"the shield law is to be broadly applied. Its provisions afford ab-
solute protection to nonparty journalists in civil litigation."1811 
The court then concluded that a privilege of nondisclosure 
exists for newsgatherers.188 Moreover, for nonparty newsgather-
ers, the privilege is absolute.187 Unfortunately, the court did not 
elaborate as to how its holding was to be found consistent with 
the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary's comment that the 
shield provides an immunity, not a privilege, except its declara-
tion that "they are the same thing."188 
New York Times is logically sound and simply stated. If, as 
is the case with all nonparty witnesses, contempt is the only 
sanction available, and contempt is prohibited by the statute, a 
privilege in substance, if not in form, must exist. The fact that it 
is labeled an immunity and not a privilege does not escape this 
conclusion. Naturally, if the wording of the statute was amended 
to reflect the existence of at least a qualified privilege, the courts 
would have less difficulty in interpreting the shield law uni-
formly. At a minimum, the courts will have an easier time with 
the shield law if the "immunity, not privilege" comment is 
excised.189 
New York Times articulates the idea that shield law cases 
should not be evaluated in terms of the content of the material 
for which protection is sought. It should be noted that the Hal-
lissy court applied this principle to the situation where disclos-
ure was urged on the basis of who the source was. Finally, the 
exact scope of protection for "unpublished material" should be 
clarified. Until it is made clear that under the express terms of 
the shield there is no difference between unpublished material 
164. Id. at 510, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070, Comment, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary 
(West Supp. 1988). 
169. Id. 
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and material which leads to sources, cases will remain inconsis-
tent and "exceptions" will continue to be carved out. 
C. AN EXAMPLE OF AN "EXCEPTION." 
Another recent appellate case, Delaney v. Superior Court,170 
held that in the "narrow situation" of a newsgatherer as an 
"eyewitness to a public event," the shield law does not apply.l7l 
In Delaney, a reporter and a photographer for the Los Angeles 
Times accompanied members of the Long Beach Police Depart-
ment on special patrol for complaints regarding drugs.172 Two 
men, observed on a bench in a mall, were questioned about an 
apparent bag of narcotics sticking out of one of the men's 
pocket.173 The officers testified that they asked defendant Dela-
ney whether they could search his jacket for weapons and that 
he consented.m Subsequently, a set of brass knuckles was found 
and Delaney was arrested. l7Ci 
Reporter Roxana Kopetman wrote an article about the inci-
dent which did not mention whether Delaney had consented to a 
search.178 Delaney moved to suppress the evidence of the brass 
knuckles on the grounds that he had not consented to the 
search.177 He subpoenaed the reporter and the photographer to 
testify about the search at the suppression hearing.178 The news-
gatherers moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the 
facts surrounding the arrest were "unpublished information" 
under the shield law.179 Their motion was denied.180 
At the suppression hearing, the reporters were called to tes-
tify on the issue of whether Delaney had consented to the search 
of his jacket.181 Although they testified about the events leading 
170. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr 60 (1988). 
171. 202 Cal. Ap. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr 60 (1988). 
172. [d. at 1023, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. 
178. [d. at 1024, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. 
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up to the search, they refused to testify about whether Delaney 
had consented to the search of the jacket.182 
The lower court held that the need for the reporters's testi-
mony outweighed any claim based on the shield law.18s The 
lower court also found that the shield law "did not apply" be-
cause the reporters were "eyewitnesses."18. The reporters were 
cited for contempt. 1811 The matter was appealed. 
After discussing the history of the shield law, the appellate 
court noted that the issue of whether an immunity existed when 
the reporter witnesses a public event was "an issue of first im-
pression."18S The court stated that its independent examination 
of the Evidence Code and the constitution "[confirmed] that the 
purpose of adding provisions regarding unpublished information 
was to strengthen the protection of sources."187 The court distin-
guished Hammarley on the tenuous grounds that the Ham-
marley court had not determined whether "eyewitness observa-
tions of a public event constitute 'unpublished information' 
under the shield law."188 
This analysis is flawed in two respects. First, the so-called 
182. [d. 
183. The municipal court found that there was a need for the reporters' "neutral 
testimony on the consent issue." [d. The appellate court offered no opinion as to the 
basis of the finding of the lower court that the reporters were indeed "neutral." 
184. [d. 
185. Delaney, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1024, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62. The superior court 
granted a writ of habeus corpus, finding that the shield law provided immunity from 
contempt. Delaney sought to vacate the order of the superior court; the appellate court 
issued an alternative writ and reinstated the contempt citation. [d. 
186. [d. at 1026, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 64. 
187. [d. The court noted that because no confidential sources were involved, "if the 
shield law is applicable, it must be based on its provisions involving unpublished infor-
mation." In support of its analysis, the court cited an analysis prepared for a 1974 
amendment (SB 1858) which stated that the protection of unpublished information was 
necessary "in order to keep open the sources of that information." [d. at 1027, 249 Cal. 
Rptr. at 65. The court also quoted the argument which appeared on the ballot in favor of 
the amendment in 1980, emphasizing the passages dealing with the protection of news 
sources. [d. 
188. [d. at 1029, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (citing Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388 at 396-
398, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 at 612-614) (court noted that in Hammarley, unpublished infor-
mation "had broad reference" to material within the reporter's knowledge, "whether con-
tained in source material or in memory"). The court found that neither Hammarley nor 
Playboy had "attempted to determine whether eyewitness observations of a public event 
constitute 'unpublished information' under the shield law." [d. 
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"eyewitness exception" could arguably be applied to every inci-
dent that a reporter observes. Ostensibly everything that a re-
porter observes and reports on happens in public. Thus, al-
though the court called its exception "narrow," the actual 
possibilities for application are endless. 
Second, the court failed to explain how its holding could 
possibly be construed as consistent with Hammarley when that 
case clearly found "unpublished information. . .contained in 
source material or in memory"189 to be protected under the 
shield law. The court in Delaney, apparently assuming that the 
only issue was the citizen's duty to testify, did not address the 
issue of whether the defendant had met the burden which would 
justify the overcoming of the privilege. In other words, the Dela-
ney court did not address the issue of whether the defendant 
had shown that without the testimony of the reporters that he 
would be denied his right to a fair trial. The opinion also did not 
discuss the issue that the cost of protecting a free press may be 
the occasional loss of relevant evidence at trial. 
Instead, the majority in Delaney relied on the fact that "the 
subject matter of the testimony is not dependant upon anyone's 
trust being placed in the newsperson."190 This meant that there 
was "no reason to differentiate the newsperson's observation 
from that of any other citizen.m91 The court flatly asserted, "in 
short, the testimony is wholly unrelated to the shield law."192 
This is a remarkable pronouncement, for arguably any time a 
reporter is called to testify about an event that he or she has 
reported on, the shield law will be at issue. 
The Delaney majority also dismissed the argument that the 
elevation of the shield law into the state constitution broadened 
the scope of its protection, finding that the elevation of the 
shield law into the constitution was primarily for the purpose of 
189. Id. In creating its eyewitness exception, the court neglected to mention that 
neither Hammarley nor Playboy discussed the issue of "eyewitnesses" because they were 
both founded on libel actions. The opinion offers little else in the way of analysis as 
support for its facile "eyewitness" distinction. 
190. Id. at 1029, 249 Cal. Rptr at 66. 
191. Id. The court did not discuss the likelihood of the average citizen's being in-
vited along on a police operation, and offered nothing else in support of its contention 
that news reporters were no different from other citizens. 
192. Id. 
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abrogating the holdings in Farr and Rosato.193 The court ne-
glected, however, to support this contention with solid evidence 
or reasoning. While it may be true that the holdings in Farr and 
Rosato provided the impetus for the constitutional amendment, 
it is more likely that the amendment was proposed in order to 
protect against judicial inroads on freedom of the press-inroads 
similar to those created by the court in Delaney.19. 
The majority's misunderstanding of the shield law is high-
lighted by the consideration that the same result might have 
been reached had they used the Hammarley/Hallissy factors. 
This was pointed out in the dissent.1911 There was no reason for 
creating an "exception" and no rationale for the finding that the 
shield law was not at issue. 
The dissent pointed out that using the Hammarley/Hallissy 
factors would have served both important interests at stake: the 
protection of the shield law and the criminal defendant's sixth 
amendment right to a fair trial,l98 Using this analysis, Delaney 
could have shown that the information was relevant and neces-
sary to his case; that it was not available from a source less in-
trusive on the privilege and that it might reasonably have led to 
his exoneration. The court could then have avoided entirely its 
analysis of the "purpose" of the shield law and focused on 
whether the defendant had met the requisite burden for over-
coming a privilege. 
As noted by the dissent, the trial court could have held an 
in camera hearing "to examine the evidence and balance the 
competing interests .... "197 Instead, the majority's "narrow ex-
ception" focused on the result. This "exception" actually has so 
broad a spectrum of application as to render it meaningless. 
193. Delaney, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 1029, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 66. 
194. The court characterized its holding as strictly limited when in fact, its possibili-
ties for application are endless. 
195. The dissent pointed out that defendant "may discover evidence protected by 
the shield laws where he demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the evidence might 
result in his exoneration .... Even with the broad protection offered by the shield law, 
the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a fair trial is still pro-
tected and of paramount importance."ld. at 1032 (emphasis in origina\). 
196. Id. The dissent found that the express language of the shield laws protected 
newsgatherers from having to disclose any unpublished information obtained in the 
course of newsgathering. 
197. Id. 
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Were newsgatherers compelled to testify about every event ob-
served in public they would undoubtedly find themselves in 
courtrooms more often than newsrooms. 
CONCLUSION 
California's courts must achieve a degree of uniformity in 
their interpretation of the shield law. The California Supreme 
Court has a unique opportunity to clarify the state of the law 
with respect to the conflicting views held by the appellate courts 
in New York Times and Delaney. There also is an opportunity 
to resolve the conflict regarding the exact scope of protection af-
forded by the shield. 
These issues need resolution. First, is there a difference be-
tween the terms "privilege" and "immunity," and what, if any, 
is the effect of the difference? Second, what is the exact scope of 
protection for unpublished information which does not lead to a 
source? Next, in evaluating cases involving the newsgatherers' 
shield, may the courts utilize more than one test? Finally, what 
are the appropriate tests to be employed? The result in Delaney 
could arguably have been reached by using the Hammerley/Hal-
lissy/New York Times analyses. The better policy is to evaluate 
whether the party seeking disclosure has met the burden which 
would justify overcoming the privilege. The following is 
recommended: 
1. In evaluating cases involving the shield law, the first in-
quiry should be whether the newsperson is a party to the action. 
Generally, where the newsgatherer is a party the action will be 
one for defamation. The Mitchell factors are well suited to eval-
uating claims based on the shield law in such cases. However, 
clarification is necessary with respect to the issue of sanctions 
against nonparty newsgatherers. The fact that parties to an ac-
tion may be subject to sanctions other than contempt should not 
be used as a basis for finding that nonparties may be found in 
contempt. 
2. If the reporter is not a party, the analysis should then 
focus on the type of action involved, civil or criminal. With res-
pect to criminal actions, the Hammarley/Hallissy analysis is 
ideal. Emphasis should be placed on the party seeking disclosure 
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and whether that party can show that the withheld information 
is relevant to his case, not available from a source less intrusive 
on the privilege, and reasonably likely to lead to his exoneration. 
3. For nonparty newsgatherers in civil actions, the analysis 
of the court in New York Times is preferable. The policy of 
maintaining the free flow of information to the public should not 
be twisted out of proportion. The newsgatherer's obligation is to 
the public; to keep the public informed. The value of subsidizing 
civil litigants' claims by utilizing newsgatherers as discovery re-
sources does little to benefit the general public. In fact, compel-
ling newsgatherers to aid civil litigants in their cases may keep 
them from fully performing their duty of maintaining the free 
flow of information. 
4. The Legislature should excise the Assembly Committee 
on the Judiciary's comment following section 1070 which states 
that the shield provides an immunity and not a privilege. The 
comment has only served as a source of confusion. Since it is not 
part of the actual text of the statute it is of questionable legal 
significance. 
The above suggestions would provide the courts with a defi-
nite guide to aid them in deciding newsgatherer's shield cases. 
Hopefully, this would lead to more consistent and predictable 
outcomes. In addition, a classification as outlined above is well 
suited to balancing and protecting all of the important rights at 
stake. It places equal value on the right of the public to be in-
formed and the press' duty to inform the public. This viewpoint 
also respects the right of all litigants, civil and criminal, to ob-
tain evidence relevant and necessary to the full and fair litiga-
tion of a case. 
Nora Linda Rousso * 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1990. 
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